Mogadishu Express

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

The Enemy Within: Al-Shabab in Villa Somalia

by Heikal I. Kenneded
Friday, August 8, 2014

The rubble from the attack of the Al-Shabab terrorists on the presidential palace of Villa Somalia

When President Hassan Sheikh was elected almost three years ago, he was too quick to declare to the world at large that Al-Shabab terrorists were “on the path to defeat” and its surviving members were more concerned for their own safety rather than plotting against his government. That is why it is appalling sight to watch lately how Al-Shabab terrorists repeatedly launch surprise attacks at the Presidential palace of Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, where the President, most of the cabinet ministers including the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament live and have their offices. Not to mention the recently tragic target killings of prominent members of the Parliament, with impunity. These sorts of assaults are tantamount to a “decapitation” of the federal government as we know it, which shows the serious security lapse in the country. It is also a testament how the government of Hassan Sheikh has completely lost its vote of confidence and support of the vast majority of the Somali population for the steady deterioration of their lives and the economy, as well as the apathy of the government in dealing with growing security threat. However, the government’s recurring reaction to the worsening insecurity in the capita has been so far to move around security officials like musical chairs, as though that’s going to fix the problem. The pragmatists argue the main reason that the federal government has terribly failed to eliminate the existential threat that Al-Shabab currently poses to the country is that it lacks both national strategy to unite the country and a tactical maneuver in which the government and the AMISOM forces together fight against Al-Shabab.

To build a national strategy, the Somali government needs to target the heart of the problem, which is none other than the severe unemployment rate in the country and lack of opportunity for the country’s largest demographic of young generation, which fosters a sense of fatalism and pessimism, eventually exploited by Al Shabab recruiters. For instance, last month’s deadly attack in the heart of the presidential palace was allegedly carried out by half a dozen of Al Shabab militants wearing the Somali military uniforms led by a young man named Mohamed Muhiyadin whose father worked in Villa Somalia. He was allegedly recruited by his brother in-law who hired him for a mere $200 in order to transport the Al Shabab terrorists with their explosives into Villa Somalia. Ironically, this treacherous incident occurred less than few weeks after President Hassan Sheikh gloated that Mogadishu’s residents were able to break their fasting in peace thanks to the “laudable” efforts and sacrifices of the security apparatus that were put in place. Further, the government needs to put in place a national strategy of rebuilding a united Somali national army, a united army that is free from clan loyalty is critical to Somalia's long-term security. The government must then develop a national security policy that fosters effective institutions, including an impartial judicial structures and a legislative framework that lay the groundwork for a stable democratic government.

Al-Shabab has proven time and time again that they are a resilient bunch of callous terrorists who can strike anytime and anywhere they wish to do so, despite the amassing of foreign troops in Somalia. This worrisome resurgence of Al-Shabab in the capital poses an existential threat to the government because Al Shabaab has mastered the art of guerrilla warfare following years of fighting invading forces: it chooses only battles that it has a chance of winning, and currently has the initiative in the south. These back-to-back attacks at the main seats of the government are raising serious concerns about the viability of the federal government’s ability to any longer hold the country together. In fact, Al-Shabab terrorists have recent years proven that they could project their terror assaults beyond Somalia’s borders by carrying out multiple deadly attacks inside the Kenyan heartland.

Given the fragility of the federal Somali government led by President Hassan Sheik, the country is tragically split into fledging federal states that cater to their clan clientele, not to mention lack of a disciplined and well-paid army, it is impossible to thwart a hardcore terrorist group like Al-Shabab. Notwithstanding building a robust national strategy, a tactical strategy is also paramount in which a tremendous pressure should be brought to bear on the capital city’s security apparatus in order to quell these types of attacks that have the potential to thwart whatever sliver of hope left over for all Somalis to linger on. The government forces in conjunction with AMISOM troops should use a blunt force approach to first clear out the local population that either supports or harbors Al Shabab terrorists, then use air strikes, artillery, and ground forces to root out these jihadist elements that remain. Strategic towns like Barawe and most of the Lower-Juba region offer safe haven against such strikes and they should be targeted for such an offensive.

No more wishful thinking

How much President Hassan Sheikh’s complacency should be blamed for this deadly revival of Al Shabab in the capital to carry out such attacks inside Villa Somalia and other relevant posts, including the House of the Parliament? Quite a lot. In other words, these latest brazen attacks of Al-Shabab militants at the “fortress” of Villa Somalia, where the heads of the nation are not safe in their fortress while the rest of the populace have to live in a state of fear and despair is a bloody reminder of how President Hassan Sheikh undermined the deadly force his government is up against and in the end become sidetracked by other less important tasks, such as the political mechanizations of regional states. Nevertheless, most analysts see such lethal attacks as a possible precursor to a broader military campaign against the government mired by incompetence and complacency to rebuild a robust security forces to dismantle the Al-Shabab terrorist network.

In the end, if President Hassan Sheikh’s government fails to defeat Al-Shabab as soon as possible, the resolve of the people to see them out of Villa Somalia will grow. In fact, the number of MPs in the parliament critical of the President’s dreadful failure to improve the country’s security conditions is already mounting exponentially by the day and it is only a matter of time before another political deadlock sets in. Not to mention the unprecedented early support of the international community has clearly waned simply because they are disappointed with the government’s modest gains on all fronts, including political, judicial and most importantly security. For example, due to the deteriorating security threat in the capital, the Turkish government recently evacuated most of its citizens from the country. The problem is that President Hassan Sheikh’s government is incessantly mired by allegations of systemic corruption and debilitating clan politics in which every step his government takes forward, it seems he’s taking two-steps backward. Most political analysts argue that an adjustment from top to bottom is inevitable because President Hassan Sheikh is caught in a trap of trying to please everyone including his harshest nemesis, which is exactly the antithesis of running a successful administration. Yet, if the President deals in reality rather than rhetoric, the Somali people may surprise him with their unfettered support and therefore rally after his government in his genuine efforts to root out Al Shabab terrorists from their last hiding places.

Finally, while Al-Shabab is obstinately committed to carrying out these deadly attacks against the heads of the Somali government and the seat of government, they have not yet attempted on similar deadly attacks against the AMISOM troops, which now exceed more than 20,000. Thus, the final question on most people’s mind is: where in the world are the AMISOM forces that were supposedly to protect the government? Because the most dismaying aspect of Al-Shabab’s resurgence in the capital is the extent and capriciousness of their attacks wherever and whenever they target despite the heavy presence of the African Union forces in the country. Apparently, they must be in the country for insidious reasons other than sustaining the government and only protect themselves.

In the final analysis, a genuine Somali federal government that shows a willingness to fight a truly national campaign against Al Shabab militants both strategically and militarily will need all the support it can get from the international community to better track down these terrorists, and to cut off both their domestic and foreign sources of financial support. The Somali society itself must decide if it will hide its head in the sand or recognize the existential threat that Al-Shabab poses to the future of normalcy, free from suicide bombers and daily explosions in their midst.

Heikal I. Kenneded
Washington D.C.
heikalk@yahoo.com

The Fear in Their Eyes!

By Heikal Kenneded
Monday, March 26, 2012

Waalagu digtaa duul haduu kuu daraan jireye, Bal dayaay daalinkii wakaas sii dabayshadaye!
Ali Dhuux (Somali Poet)

The latest surfaced video on the internet by Abu Mansur Al-Amriki in which he claims that he is in great danger because his life is “threatened by the Harakat al Shabab al Mujahedeen,” seals the end of Al-Shabab in Somalia, as we know it. What’s even more riveting about this video, beyond the crumbling terrorist organization’s war within its cadre is the flagrant fear in the eyes of the American native who left the US to fight with Al-Shabab. This allows the viewers to get inside the mortified terrorist mastermind’s dread of death. A sense of bereavement and cry for help hovers over his demeanor, not simply because he’s worried that his terrorist organization is defeated, but because he feels the end of his life is nigh and death is around the corner.

This shocking video only runs few seconds, but even those few seconds carry an appalling sense of apprehension that lingers in the eyes of the terrorist. He claims in the video due to differences of strategic opinion or misunderstanding among the terrorist organization’s leadership has made him fear for his life. Paradoxically, here’s one of the most hardcore jihadists within the Al-Shabab core group who recruited naive Somali teenagers from the ends of the earth in order to train them as suicide bombers in the name of Islam. And now that his days are numbered and his life is meted out the same destiny that he’s misled to many others, he’s shaking with fear and not able to face his fateful destiny - "Live by the sword, die by
the sword!"

Omar Shafik Hammami who now goes by the nom de guerre of Abu Mansur Al-Amriki was born in Alabama, U.S.A and joined Al-Shabab militia in 2006. Since his early days of joining the militia, he acted as the mouthpiece for Al Shabab and was notorious for producing jihad-laden rap songs to lure young Somalis in the Diasporas to join Al-Shabab for jihad. He is now reported to have been abducted and detained by some of his closest comrades. I am sure if he ever gets his freedom back, he’d start rapping a different tune.

Since the trounced Al-Shabab insurgents currently face an increasing number of major challenges to their sustained longevity as the de facto prevailing force of much of southern and central Somalia, contentious infighting among the group has become rife and deadly. Reliable sources have reported that this latest straw that escalated into this lethal internal strife among the highest ranking of the Al-Shabab militants mainly stems from their recent declaration that they officially joined forces with Al-Qaeda network. It’s alleged that this new “desperate” alliance did not go down well with several key leaders, including Mukhtar Roobow and his lieutenants who all along felt sidelined and exploited by the militia’s highest ranking leadership, the reclusive Ahmed Godane and a cohort of his overzealous foreign fighters. Not to mention the crippling financial hardships that the militia faced recently due to the Arab Spring and incessant loss of fighters and strategic positions in city battles, which has made the terrorist group’s bitter infighting inexorable.

Further, faced with mounting battlefield setbacks, Al-Shabab leaders have repeatedly reached out to local clan leaders for financial support that fell on deaf ears, which eventually made their recruiting efforts a futile effort. Most of the Somali clans who were originally Al-Shabab sympathizers must have suspected all along these rogue insurgents were funded by foreign elements who also gave them their marching orders. Hence, when the militia joined forces with the Al-Qaeda network, most of these clans realized their suspicions were right on the mark and now decided to find other horses to bet on, as they pulled the plug on Al-Shabab.

That brings in the golden chance presented to the TFG leadership in that they need to make a strategic decision in the face of this new dawn, as the Somali forces backed by AMISOM edge out Al-Shabab from most of the key important provinces. The TFG should immediately set up reliable and credible local authorities to administer these newly liberated provinces, towns and local municipalities. In other words, how the TFG deals with this very challenge will determine the long term success of ending the government's transitional period. If the expectations are too high for the TFG leadership, they are off the charts when it comes to the rest of the Somali society, especially the well educated Somali Diaspora and their role to fill in the extraordinary vacuum that exists in the country, created by the protracted civil war that lasted over two decades. This by itself will depend on the make or break to bring Somalia back into the community of nations

Heikal I. Kenneded
Washington D.C.
heikalk@yahoo.com

Lessons NOT Learned from the Historic Somali Manifesto Group

Heikal Kenneded
Tuesday, August 11, 2009

One of the most significant events that took place right before the Somali nation-state plunged into an intractable civil-war was the publication of the Somali Manifesto in 1990, signed by more than 100 prominent people, including some of the most revered Somali leaders, scholars, religious, and elders in the civic society. This historic document began with the solemn declaration: “We, the undersigned elders, who took part in the national struggle for independence…strongly and unanimously, feel that we can no longer remain passive spectators, nor ignore the duties and responsibilities that we owe to our people and our country.” This was the most devastating blow to the delusional dictatorship regime at that time, which missed a great exit strategy to save its legacy and the Somali nation-state from going into a full-blown civil war. For the past two decades, however, what has been missing from the picture are such selfless souls who are willing to stand up against tyranny and the perpetual violence that has plagued most of the country. As such, the root of the Somali demise, which has perplexed many, stems from shortages of patriotism and effective leadership.

The courageous signatories of the Manifesto Group minced no words in their efforts to warn that the dictator’s days of free-reign-terror were about to end and our nation’s existence was at crossroads. In effect, they introduced a definitive conflict-resolution initiative that outlined the way forward for salvaging the country from a precipice. Unfortunately, the dictatorial regime, being what it was ignored the serious recommendations of the Manifesto and continued its despicable path to destruction by arresting many of the signatories, which eventually precipitated its final downfall.

After Siyad Barre and his weak army were run out of Mogadiscio by the USC militia, who were allied at that time with the Manifesto Group, nominated Ali Mahdi to the presidency of Somalia. This has in turn infuriated General M.F. Aideed who couldn’t accept anyone else but himself to become Somalia’s president. The conflict between these two camps that were initially in agreement to overthrow the dictatorship regime further trampled the Group’s plan and eventually plunged the country into civil strife. In the following years were marked with clan hegemony at the expense of national sovereignty and central authority. Dozens of notoriously ruthless warlords emerged from the ruins of the civil war, keeping the people hostage to the gun while cashing in the country’s dwindling resources. It was a prime example of societal self-destruction. Furthermore, the heinous years of cannibalizing the country as whole have resulted in the creation of another much worse monster -- hooligans claiming to be religious men who kill and destroy everything in their path in the name of Allah.

The dismal suicide of the Somali nation has become a classic case that no other nation on earth wishes to repeat. In fact, the core trait of the Somali being is in question in regards to what motives drive our reckless self-destruction and whether we should be treated as normal human beings. A lasting peace and stability is, however, impeded by a serious lack of nationalism among all Somalis. Besides the déjà-vu effect of witnessing yet another fledgling transitional government and a rogue militia (in this case Al-Shabab) vying for the rule of the country, we all have an important role to play to foster an everlasting peace in Somalia. We could all come together in support of our country and our people to stop the cycle of violence that precludes long-term peace, while denying our support for anyone who seeks or attains power through means of violence.

Even so, there are promising opportunities. The international community, especially the U.S. once again is willing to give Somalia a second chance to put its house in order. Much will depend on leadership. What are needed are effective visionaries who can breathe new life into our dying nation. It’s hard to underestimate how important a shift this is for Somalia, which lacked the long-deserved attention and sympathy of the world community. Recognition from foreign entities is, of course, no guarantee to a peaceful path, since dynamic leaders are required on the ground as well as the full support of the people.

The way forward

In tackling pervasive violence, collective nationalism is the only way forward. Somalis in the Diasporas who have experienced the harsh realities of being a foreigner should take the lead in organizing themselves and providing support for the progressive, grass-roots elements inside the country, but without falling into the entrapments of tribalism or regionalism. Through such initiatives, we could enhance a positive dialogue among the warring factions and revitalize much needed nationalism required to bring a lasting peace in the country. I am convinced that without dealing squarely our nonchalance, Somalia will continue towards its hasty precipice.

Indeed, there have been a few heroic individuals over the years that have emerged during this long draught of nationalism such as the late peace activists Mohamud Ali Ahmed (Elman), Abdulkadir Yahya Ali, and Istarlin Abdi Arush, not to mention the dozens of journalists who were assassinated in the past few years. They have all paid the ultimate price to save our nation, despite the daunting tasks and danger they faced individually. Perhaps the gathering support from the international community will trigger the kind of collective social conscience that engenders nationalism. In the meantime, we can all be proud of the great courage demonstrated by the signatories of the historic Somali Manifesto and could only hope to follow on their heels at this moment of peril that our nation-state is edging to perish from the earth. Inshallah.

Washington, D.C
heikalk@yahoo.com

Time to Govern: Protection of Ethnic Minorities at the Regional Level

by Heikal I. Kenneded
Sunday, April 14, 2013

The true measure of a civilized society is gauged by how it treats the poor, weak, vulnerable, and ultimately ethnic minority groups of its society. The current political crisis in Somalia’s Lower Juba region is not coincidently the result of structural turmoil or merely the accidental collapse of the state, per se. However, it is the plausible outcome of the susceptibility of the state in a society where we have collectively marginalized and maltreated all minority ethnic groups. The key to any genuine peace-building efforts should protect the rights of the “minority” who represent the majority of the region’s displaced victims. Unless minority rights are enshrined in both the country and regional states’ draft constitutions and implemented through the justice systems, there is a little chance that Somalia’s fledgling semblance of normalcy will come to pass.

Unfortunately, most Somalis tend to deny the existence of ethnic minority groups in Somalia and much worse ignore their plight of being discriminated against since the dawn of the Somali history. Nevertheless, minorities in Somalia were originally considered as any of the clans or communities that did not belong genealogically to any one of the three dominant clans, such as Hawiye, Darod, and Dir clans. Ironically, the agro-pastoral Raxanweyn clans who represent more than one-third of the country’s population were originally considered as a “minority,” and at the height of the civil war most of their farms and land were appropriated by the invading militias. In fact, the current political strife in Kismayo and the race among major dominant clans to take control over the Lower Juba regional reminds me during the early days of the civil war, when dominant clans were competing to take control over certain key provinces located in the interriverine area of southern Somalia in order to exploit the fertile land in these regions. Enticed by the ecological richness of the Juba-Shabelle valley region, the armed conflict that began in early 199os to overthrow the dictatorship regime has incongruously turned into a struggle between the dominant clan groups for control over natural resources. Most of the economically important interriverine areas were originally inhabited by “minority” clans, who were usually peaceful and never had the possession of weapons or military capacity to defend themselves and their land from the marauding militias.

Several prominent districts located in the interriverine area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, including Janaale, Afgoye, Marka, Barawe, Jilib, and Qoryoley the minority indigenous tribes or communities who rightfully owned most of the land were forcibly displaced by dominant clans who claim to have liberated these lands from the “illegal occupation” of the deposed Siyad Barre regime, and therefore declared themselves as the proper owners of the land. For example, the displacement of the reer Gosha or "Mushunguli" communities in the lower Juba Valley is one of the most hideous outcomes of the Somali civil war. In effect, thousands of reer Gosha farmers were displaced and their agricultural resources were plundered, resources for which these communities depended for their very existence. Not to mention the absolute displacement and expulsion of the Barawan communities from Barawe at the height of the civil war, as one of the most despicable outcomes of the war. Moreover, the recent famine in the south of the country, and all the other misfortunes associated with the intra-state violence in southern Somalia is compounded by considerable human rights abuse against ethnic minority communities along the Shebelle and Juba River valleys.

There is much to admire about the governing policies so far pursued by President Hassan Sheikh during his first few months in the office. He has indeed turned a corner by skillfully blending strategic optimism with tactical maneuver, while he has made the most out of a fragile state that could go either way – a turn for the worse or a greater resolve. Only one flaw seems to betray the President’s trudge towards greatness, however. Despite the fact of advocating good governance and human rights on top of his priorities list, there are indications that a disregard for minority rights, which lies at the heart of most conflicts in some of the most contested regions in the country. Thus, the current Somali government’s mandate should be based on one that protects the rights and properties of ethnic minorities at the regional level in order to achieve a lasting peace based on justice and freedom for all.

Most Somalis would like to see stronger governance across three broad categories of endeavors. First, to demonstrate stronger resolve in establishing a safe and security environment in all government held provinces and towns in the country. It is imperative that new territorial gains from previously held by the Al-Shabab militia must not come undone at the expense of intra-political squabble with regional state authorities. In other words, the government must maintain its foothold in all areas under its administration and therefore secure the progress in these areas. Second, to demonstrate a greater resolve the transitioning of the country into a federalism state government system, in a clan based country like Somalia. In fact, this is one of the most intractable issues currently facing the government, which will test the new government’s ability to lead and govern the rest of the country. Finally, the new government must reform the botched justice system that became obsolete over the last two decades and build a credible judicial system that will ultimately protect the rights of all Somalis, including the especial rights of ethnic minorities. The President’s legacy will most likely be defined by how he succeeds in resolving the federalism issue, which at the moment doesn’t seem to include in his “six pillar” policy during his first four-year term. In other words, if Somalia cannot effectively deal with its provincial governance and allows the meddling of rogue warlords packed by unhelpful foreign governments, it will set a terrible precedent for dealing with the overall security issue of the country.

Somalia’s image around the world has quite recently improved and this should give the government a tremendous leverage to independently put its house in order. Both the President and Parliament need to demonstrate a strong resolve when it comes to implementing internal crisis-management. The final constitution document should draw a red line that no regional government is above the federal constitution and respect for the rights of ethnic minorities as the core of its constitutional principle. Despite the crippling budget constraints that the government currently operates, it can influence the political reigns of most of its regional states, however. The question is how far reaching its influence can change for the better the dynamics of the country’s various emerging regional states in order to raise awareness and empower different stakeholders, including the “minorities” on human rights primarily of the ethnic minorities at both the regional and national level.

A long thorny road lies ahead to correct all past mistakes, but the recently concluded judicial reforms conference in Mogadishu is a step in the right direction that should pave the way for the legal, policy and institutional framework to address important themes of ethnicity and human rights issues relevant at the regional levels. There is an urgent need for a national policy that recognizes different ethnic groups in the country and ethnic minorities beyond the current classification based on the notorious 4.5 system. This new policy should incorporate issues of subjection and vulnerability endured by most minority groups and thus recognizing the need to protect and promote the rights of ethnic minorities throughout Somalia, especially at the regional level. In other words, it is imperative as a starting point for the government to sincerely acknowledge that there are ethnic minorities in Somalia and they’ve disproportionately suffered discrimination and other human rights violations during pre-and-post-civil-war. In effect, these minority communities should be recognized as the legitimate residents of certain regions, towns, and districts with rights to political representation on district councils and MPs.

In summary, the new Somali government has to commit to putting an end of the illegal appropriation and displacement of defenseless ethnic communities’ land and properties in the Mid-and-Lower Juba River valley. Otherwise, the search for a lasting peace in Somalia will perpetually remain elusive and problematic, as long as the government fails to address the structural violence that has greatly contributed to the intrastate crisis of the country, in the first place.

Heikal I. Kenneded
Washington D.C.
heikalk@yahoo.com

Politics of Resource Control Hampering Famine Relief Efforts in Southern Somalia

by Heikal Kenneded
Wednesday, September 28, 2011

In a critical time when the United Nations and donor agencies are issuing a grim warning that the famine catastrophe in southern Somalia could soon spiral out of control, with the potential to decimate hundreds of thousands (750,000 to be exact) more lives in the coming months. Despite unprecedented aid pouring in from every corner around the world, little relief has trickled into the empty pots and pans of the majority of the famine victims. As if things weren't dire enough in southern Somalia, then comes along the disillusioned mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Ahmed Nur better known as Tarzan, marching with his draconian aid restrictions ban of all foreign aid workers from traveling to the southern towns under the control of the al-Shabab militants. Instead, the mayor suggested that the foreign aid workers should transfer all the relief aid to the local NGOs, which can deliver to the drought victims in al-Shabab areas. Mr. Tarzan’s twisted logic is that his government is solely responsible for the security of foreign aid workers, while he is completely apathetic to the grim plight of the famine victims of his people in the south.

Mr. Tarzan’s reckless policy threatens to undermine the worldwide effort to alleviate the suffering of the famine victims in southern Somalia. He’s justifying this ruling after members of a Turkish charity dared to deliver food to the famine victims in several towns ruled by the al-Shabab forces, which embarrassed the TFG’s claim that such acts were infeasible. But what the mayor doesn’t appreciate is that most aid agencies are adapted to the daily grind and insecurity coupled with serving aid to the needy in conflict regions around the world. Thus many are starting to wonder whether Mr. Tarzan has the basic competency to be a mayor of the capital, or much worse whether he has lost all sort of human empathy that he’s inkling to become a famine profiteer.

During his short tenure as Mogadishu’s mayor, Mr. Tarzan who many simply refer to as the “Mad Mayor of Mogadishu” has been leveled at many unscrupulous charges, including money laundering, mismanagement and misuse of government income and aid from donor agencies. But he’s now bent on committing one of the worst human rights violations by banning foreign aid agencies reaching out to the victims of the draught and famine in southern Somalia. In fact, the mayor is legitimizing the recent accusations leveled at the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by an Al-Shabab spokesperson who alleged that they are using the draught and the famine debacle as a weapon of war by banning food and aid to reach in the southern provinces under their control. In other words, through such reckless diktat will not only have negative repercussions against the TFG by alienating the suffering famine victims in the south but it will also overturn the dwindling support of the Al-Shabab insurgents.

Instead the TFG leadership should put all political inclinations and machinations aside in order to alleviate the famine afflicted victims in the south, so far these efforts have, in different ways, failed. The priority, in any case, should be finding creative ways to deliver the aid directly to the victims of the worst humanitarian disaster, wherever they might be, either inside or outside of the country. In other words, it’s very disingenuous to play politics of resource control on the plight of the famine victims, and rather cynical for Mr. Tarzan to be more concerned about the safety and security of the foreign aid agencies than that of his starving people under the occupation of the Islamic extremists. Nonetheless, the hurdles faced by these goodwill donor aid agencies are many and telling them where they can deliver aid or not should never be one of them.

Call it the curse that multiplies in hundred folds because initially the world put all the blame on Al-Shabab militants for exacerbating the drought of the century into a famine by banning foreign aid agencies to deliver food in the southern areas under their control. But now we’ve to deal with the harsh politics of resource control by the TFG leadership deciding where aid agencies could deliver food or not. In fact, the impact of this cynical aid restrictions cannot be overemphasized in the famine afflicted southern Somalia and the painful distress it has already rendered with so many lives at stake.

Of course, both local and foreign aid agencies relatively face risk throughout Somalia, but it’s a calculated risk that runs no parallel whatsoever to what the millions of starving Somalis are currently facing in the south. But the simple fact is that Tarzan has decided to put politics of resource control before humanity and the TFG is missing out an opportunity to proof its legitimacy and consolidate its power in the southern provinces by taking the PR war to Al-Shabab.

Finally, this is a prime example of how a misguided policy could hamper the TFG’s efforts to prove itself to the Somali people and to the rest of the world that they really care to safeguard their own people and country. Thus the TFG led by President Sheikh Sharif and Prime Minister Abdiweli Gaas are confronted a historic test in their dual efforts to pacify the country from the callous Al-Shabab militants and to eradicate the debilitating impact of the famine in the south. And unless the latter challenge is effectively tackled with unprecedented altruism and patriotism, their leadership will continue to be mired with allegations of corruption and poor governance resulted from ineffectual leadership. There is still a window of opportunity for the TFG to overturn this ill-advised policy and allow all foreign aid agencies to travel to everywhere they deem necessary to deliver aid to the suffering famine victims. But if TFG leadership continues to sit on its high horse and maintain its indifferent stance, the country will continue its downward precipice.

I urge Prime Minister Abdiweli Gaas who was recently here in the U.S. to turn his rhetoric of implementing a formidable government in Somalia within one year into an action and to pull rank by immediately overruling the misguided ban of reaching out to the famine victims in southern Somalia by foreign aid agencies. The famine victims in the South cannot afford to wait any longer.

Heikal Kenneded
Washington, D.C.
heikalk@yahoo.com

Somaliland: Another African Biafra?

By Heikal I. Kenneded
Friday, January 25, 2008

As most readers remember about the short-lived secessionistRepublic of Biafra in southern Nigeria (1967- 1970), small separatist states have a rather shaky trajectory of existence. When Nigeria, which like

Somalia

became an independent nation in 1960, its borders were arbitrarily made up by its British colonial power. This made one “nation” by combining several feudal states into one. After independence, in the mid-1960s, the military took over; the economy of Nigeria went southward, ethnic tensions flared. This resulted in many thousands of the Ibo tribe to be killed in fighting with Hausas, while more than a million refugees fled to their Ibo clan homeland in the Eastern Nigeria. Consequently, on May 30, 1967, the leader of the Eastern Region, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, unilaterally declared the independent Republic of Biafra. The new nation of Biafra initially attracted several African governments’ support, including Tanzania, Gabon, and Zambia, while it had also enjoyed the military and economic support of several developed nations, such as France, Israel, and South Africa. Finally, the breakaway state of Biafradescended into a raging civil war that eventually saw its catastrophic downfall after only three years its conception as an independent nation-state. Might Somaliland be heading for a repeat of Biafra?

Those who champion Somaliland’s independence would like to draw a parallel between their renegade state and that of neighboring country Eritrea, which earned its independence from Ethiopia almost at the same time (circa. 1991) that Somaliland declared its secession from the Somali Republic proper. Most political analysts, however, would rather liken Somaliland to that of the failed state of Biafra. Most important of all, critics point out to how little progress Somaliland made in regards to economic development, political stability, and genuine democratic values during its “independent” existence. Recently, Somaliland has been engaged in destructive skirmishes with its neighboring state, Puntland, which is a clear indication of how direly unstable Somaliland is. In addition, despite extraordinary support from northern Somalis in the Diaspora, the state’s economy is still in shambles, while the infrastructure is despicably in tatters. Equally worrying is the recent expulsion of Somali journalists expelled from Mogadiscio and seeking asylum in Hargeisa. This is another example of how intolerant Somaliland is to outside media, lest they serendipitously stumble on undemocratic practices in their government.

The more likely explanation is that the timing and the manner of their choosing to declare their secession was deeply flawed and opportunistic, it’s bound to fail – for reasons explained below. It’s no wonder that President Riyale and his henchmen are stoking fears within their constituents that their state is reveling in democracy and stability while the rest of the Somalia is going into flames in order to dampen any further questions about their failure to lead and achieve tangible developments or recognition of their “independence” for the past two decades.

Background

Now, few people would put their bets on the idea that the so called Somaliland state would ever achieve any international recognition as an independent country. Almost two decades after its secession from the rest ofSomalia, Somaliland’s leaders are struggling to find a sympathetic audience among the international community. In fact, the recent setbacks or snubs encountered by President Riyale during his recent trips in theUS and Great Britain underscore the reality on the ground http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-01-17-voa69.cfm. Despite the ferocious campaign of the separatist leadership of Somaliland to attain recognition for their small state for the past 17 years, there were few results to show for it. Conventional wisdom has it thatSomaliland has failed to achieve its independence, in part because it’s either too fractious in clan composition to stand on it own, or it sets a dangerous precedent for other disgruntled states in the African continent. I am of the opinion that this is the case because there has been a failure of leadership to make the case thatSomaliland is a state worthy to stand independently on its own. Moreover, there are indications that such a “premature” secession from the rest of Somalia, while not stable and only such a concession, might lead to future conflicts in the region. Winning international recognition is crucial, and not just for the sake of recognition, per se, but rather vital for a small, poor “country” like that of Somaliland. That’s not to say, however, that Somaliland cannot continue to exist for a long time and prosper as a renegade state like that ofTaiwan.

But the question is what compelled Somaliland in the first place to secede unilaterally from the rest of the union – the Somali Republic? In looking back at some of the rationalization put forth over the years by many of the separatist leaders in Somaliland, can be broken down into three main premises: first, when Somalia and Somaliland merged as the Somali Republic, shortly after the two states achieved their independence, respectively from Italy and Britain in 1960, it was the northerners in Somaliland who took the initiative to unite with their southern Somali brethren and subsequently proposed an Act of Union that was afterward passed in unison with the south. Despite their selfless act to realize the dream of a “Greater Somalia,” leaders from the North found themselves to be rather underappreciated and constantly shunted to the sidelines when the first National Government was formed and throughout the civilian government rule (1960–1969) before the Siyad Barre regime came and consolidated its power under dictatorship. The second, accusatory claim, is that they (Somaliland) were also single handedly targeted and had committed against them a “genocide” by the Siyad Barre regime, while the rest of the Southern clans either stood by or in some cases colluded with the dictator in his ferocious “ethnic cleansing” of the Isaaqs in northern Somalia. And thirdly, there’s the naïve argument that Somaliland was “pushed” to declare its unilateral decision to secede from the Union when the southern leaders formed a national government without consulting with their counterpart leaders in the SNM leadership in the north, after the successful overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991.

In fact, no one can argue honestly against the claim that the leaders of Somaliland at the time of independence were at the forefront of advocating the creation of the union between the south and north of Somalia. To take that laudable historic step back, however, the current Somaliland leaders need to come up with a reasonable justification of annulling such a commendable act of uniting the country. Despite the chaotic democratic elections in the country during the 1960s, the relatively minority northern sub-clans held enough parliament seats and presidency of the National Assembly, in addition to the Prime Minister’s position in the last civilian government (1967-1969) – PM M. Hajji Ibrahim Egal. Because in any fledgling democracy, there are always the trappings of one ethnic or clan group being sidelined or underrepresented – not a viable reason to break a union because of past grievances to rule.

The second claim and most pernicious allegation that the southern Somali clans colluded with the callous Siyad Barre in their darkest hour of “elimination” could not be further from the truth. This is a baseless claim to incite hatred and probably drive a wedge between the northern and southern Somali peoples. In other words, it is malicious propaganda used by some separatist leaders in order to unite the historically “conflict-prone” northern Isaaq sub-clans. Thus, to set the record straight for posterity’s sake, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which valiantly fought against the Siyad Barre dictatorial regime in the north, were many times on the receiving end of both the moral and military support of their counterpart southern opposition groups (e.g. USC) during their struggle for freedom.

In a gripping book* by Jama M. Ghalib who originally hails from the north and a prominent supporter of the SNM (an ex-minister of the Siyad Barre regime), details in his book, for instance, how the late human rights activist, honorable Dr. Ismail Jimale Osoble, the first chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC) graciously protested in the international arena about the “genocide” of the northern sub-clans by the ruthless Siyad Barre army, led by General Gani and General Morgan. In his efforts to stop the massacre in the north, Dr. Ismail Jimale also convinced many of his Hawiye clan elders in the south to extend their support to southern army officers posted in the north in order to mutiny against the Siyad Barre regime and join forces with SNM. As Mr. Ghalib attests in his book, several patriotic southern army officers later “joined the SNM attack on Hargeisa on December 1989.” In his book, Mr. Ghalib also discusses how initially some of the SNM leadership officers declined the selfless support of their counterpart southern officers in getting rid of the country the weakened dictator. The author alludes that there were already secessionist elements rife within the SNM commanding officers and their leadership who had no desire whatsoever to associate themselves with anyone else from the south, lest they would thwart their long-term goal – to secede from the rest of Somalia.

On the third premise, that Somaliland was “pushed” to declare a unilateral independence from the rest of the Somali Republic proper was due to the “rushed” and one-sided decision to form a government in part of the USC leadership after the successful overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime is groundless. This theory is more compelling than convincing as history shows differently. In reality, this is another erroneous theory concocted and propagated once again by some of the separatist, mean-spirited leadership of the former SNM faction who among themselves couldn’t agree who would hold important ministerial cabinets of the “short-lived” Somali government led by president Ali Mahdi and Omar Arte Ghalib as its prime minister. In fact, it was only after an incestuous conflict flared within the USC leadership - between Ali Mahdi and General M. Farah Aideed in which the SNM leadership agreed unanimously to secede and form its own government in the north. Thus, this is a clear indication that most northerners were bamboozled into secession by some of their manipulative leaders who decided to jump ship when things took a downward slope in the south, instead of correcting their erred brothers and working towards a better resolution for a stronger Somalia.

Conclusion

It seems that Somaliland has benefited from the ever escalating violence and chaos in the rest of Somalia in regards of making their case to the rest of the world and rebuilding their war-ravaged lives. But it remains to be seen if they stay the course of being cohesive and progressive once the warring factions in the south come to their senses and work towards peace and justice. Perhaps, the only certain thing about Somaliland is this: without a genuine and honest dialogue with the rest of the Somalia proper, its chances for a successful independence are doomed. Even the most ardent separatist champions in Somaliland are aware of this fact, but they claim that at the current volatile situation in the south of Somalia, there’s no viable partner of peace to conduct with such negotiations. Though the chances of bridging the gap between the self-righteous south and the dubious northerners seem implausible, there’s a hope for better days to come in the Horn of Africa. It’s too soon to say what will ultimately become the fate of the Somali union. It may all depend on how the leaderships from the two sides of the union behave in order to save the “marriage.” But I am sure every one will agree with me that neither the current leadership in the north nor in the south is posed to tackle such delicate matters in the union of the state. Instead, both presidents, Mr. Riyale and Mr. Yusuf are deeply entangled in the brawl of territorial feud involved in their clan homelands. Their past history also lends them little credibility in engaging peaceful negotiations any time soon.

* The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. By Jama Mohamed Ghalib. New York: Lillian Barber Press, 1995. Pp. Xvi, 267

Heikal I. Kenneded
Washington D.C. heikalk@yahoo.com

Debacle at Sea

by Heikal Kenneded
Monday, October 28, 2013

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As clichés go, Somalia has been without a functioning government since 1991 and one of the most dismal collateral damages resulting from the civil war is its desperate youth taking to the dangerous seas in their odyssey to find a safe-haven in Europe and beyond. From the early 1990s to present day, thousands of Somali young men and women have lost their lives in their attempt to flee the civil war, when the boats carrying became capsized en route to European shores. The incessant anguish of Somali asylum seekers is the heart of the problem for a nation in turmoil besieged by war, famine and terrorism. Desperate to escape from the grim reality in the country and hope for a better future, the Somali young people daringly jump into the “Seas of the Dead.” These tragedies have gone too long and too many live have been lost in vain that the Somali government has to step up its efforts to curb youth unemployment, while the world at large must use this impetus to stabilize Somalia and rein in terrorism and piracy crises in the Horn of Africa.

At the onset of the Somali civil war, I was among the first wave of refugees who braved the dangerous seas on a rickety boat with no engine and crossed the Somali border into Kenya in order to escape the fighting. After two decades of my desperate adventure, it breaks my heart to see most of Somalia’s youth are subjected to such cruel destinies while the rest of the world watches with utter disregard of these tragedies. For most Somali asylum seekers who take to the high seas are fully aware of the serious risks they face in the seas by boarding overloaded vessels and sailing on pending bad weather because they have relinquish all hope of finding peace and prosperity to prevail in their own country.

According to the United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, Somalia is “the third biggest country” whose refugees arrive on European shores. These last two weeks’ tragedy where two such vessels carrying more than two hundred asylum seekers have lost their lives in their attempt to reach European shores should be a wakeup call to the Somali government and the rest of the world about the crisis in which these youths are escaping from to take such fatal risks on their lives. Though, this is hardly surprising, after the country went through two grueling decades of civil war and the chaos that comes with it, which has devastated the lives of an entire generation with neither proper education nor gainful employment to improve their chances to succeed. The only option available to many of these young people has been to take their chances on finding hope in overseas, despite the serious risks involved.

It’s also clear that the newly elected Somali government is not taking these tragedies seriously as political stability problem, as well as simply security issue. President Hassan Sheikh has now been Somalia’s president for more than a year, yet he has not seized the opportunity to deal with the root causes of the country’s security problems. The most fundamental is that unless Somalia must gainfully occupies its youth by either improving the education system or creating enough employment, peace will always be an elusive past. Given Somalia’s security tribulations, some emphasis on job creation is inevitable because the two issues are inexorably interlinked. Despite all the talk of the new Somali government for turning a corner to improve the country’s security, economic opportunities are still rare and the youth have no choice but to venture out of the country and risk their lives to find better opportunities in overseas. The President’s resolve of tackling the country’s grotesque unemployment problem should be decisive, vigorous and most importantly pragmatic. In other words, mounting an effective challenge to Al-Shabab’s recruitment efforts lies in creating opportunities for the youth in the country.

The European Union spends millions of money on border enforcements and deporting immigrants that eventually do not really discourage most of these asylum seekers many of whom brave the seas time and again. In other words, border enforcement and compulsory deportation do not unfortunately address the core problems that drive these youths to risk their lives in the extreme high seas. However, the European Union in conjunction with the Somali government could prevent these recurrent tragedies in their seas, and divert the flow of asylum seekers permanently, by simply addressing the “push” factors that impel African asylum seekers, including Somalis to risk their lives in the first place — and by helping their families avoid the heartache associated with such exodus in the perilous seas.

Figure 1. Coffins of some of the Somali victims of the October disaster in a hangar at Lampedusa airport. (Photograph: Luca Bruno/AP)

For too long, the European Union’s immigration policy has turned a blind eye on the innumerable African immigrants dying on its seas and shores. But now that the predicament of these immigrants has worsened since the Arab Spring because travelling to Europe across the Mediterranean ocean has never been easier, which saw for the last two years, tens of thousands of people travelling from North Africa to reach either Malta or Italy. Unfortunately, these two European countries have some of the worst immigration laws in Europe and treat with all disregards the rights and dignity of African asylum seekers by either throwing them in jail as though they’re criminals or deporting them back to their country of origin, upon arrival. Thus, the International community must demand a different approach from the European countries, one in line with the international migration and human rights.

For the European Union to abate these tragedies at their shores, they could increase aid to Somalia to improve education and create new skills for the youth, which would lower such perilous adventures, in the first place. The EU could finance or promote microloans to help youth start job-generating businesses. For example, the EU could gear its ineffective anti-piracy efforts to investing the lives of these young men and women who are risking their lives due to the lack of opportunities in their country. In addition, it could work with local non-profit organizations in Somalia who endeavor toward investing in job-creating enterprises.

Finally, the world, including Somalia, has a duty to save the Somali youth from risking their precious lives in the seas in order for them to achieve their dreams. Provided the Somali government is transparent and accountable enough to its people, the International community should help with economic development and job creation.

Heikal Kenneded
Washington D.C.
heikalk@yahoo.com

Open Letter to Somali Prime Minister M. A. Farmaajo: How to Win in Somalia

by Heikal KennededFriday, December 03, 2010

Dear Prime Minister M. A. Farmaajo: Congratulations on the recent approval of your new cabinet by the parliament. Many supporters in the Diaspora and I are proud of the high caliber of your lean cabinet (18 ministers) who carry the hope and dream of many despaired Somalis both in the country and in the Diaspora. Unfortunately, you come into power at our country’s direst moment, when no one exactly knows how to cease the vicious cycle of violence that has plagued our society or why is the country still burning after almost two decades of civil strife? And what can be done to defeat the so called Islamic militants who are bent on putting the last nail in the coffin of Somalia’s existence? Winning in Somalia, however, requires your new administration to appreciate the changed nature of the conflict you are dealing with and to adapt your approaches appropriately. Simply eradicating Islamic militants through force is no longer a viable option. Since all previous transitional administrations went the wrong way about untangling the failed Somali state by either turning a deaf ear to the country’s total collapse, while getting rich themselves, or even much worse by engaging in clan politics that further fueled the conflict and eventually caused the loss of life and displacement of thousands of people. Your highly skilled new administration has the rare opportunity to correct all of these past wrongs and set our country on the right path for national reconciliation and nation rebuilding.

As you’re well aware the current intractable conflict in Somalia is no longer purely clan warfare fighting for territorial dominance, but part of a global jihadist agenda that exploits the status quo in order to use Somalia as a launching pad for international terrorism. A terror campaign often well funded and supported by foreign sinister elements in neighboring countries or other Al-Qaedalinked terrorist organizations. Their supporters continuously shuttle foreign fighters into Somalia. They also use hard currency and illegal arms to recruit from the vast pool of illiterate young men in the country who live out of survival in the continued poverty and chaotic violence in the country. In other words, these Islamic militants like their warlord predecessors find every chance to wreak havoc with impunity in the unraveling of the social and economic fabric ever since the collapse of the Somali nation state.

Countering against this changing alliance of expediency between well-funded global Jihadist extremists operating in Somalia and local discontents, a new approach is required to win back Somalia. The current collapse from within, hence, cannot be defeated from the top down but rather a bottom-up reform. Though strengthening the security of the capital is imperative, such endeavor would be a rather futile effort without a complementary attempt of running a transparent government, which can translate into the support of the international donor countries. In addition, a great endeavor should be made to repatriate fresh minds from the Somali Diaspora (similar to the current cabinet) who are able to invest in the country and build the indispensable institutions at the local level that can eventually be connected to the transitional government. In light of the new reality in the country, working within the decentralized reality of the Somali society is essential to defeating the hard-lined Islamic fundamentalist insurgents, Al Shabab.

Hence, the changed nature of the Somali conflict entails adapting four key strategic approaches.

(1) Fight corruption to the bone within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and secure critical economic at both the national and local level. No wonder Somalia is the most corrupt country in the world, according to the latest Transparency International report. Corruption has marred every aspect of the Somali society due to kleptocratic government officials who continuously grow affluent at the cost of the poor and displaced. A transparent government coupled with a functional economy would be able to win back the unwavering support from the civil society and the international donor agencies, and ultimately weaken the hardened Islamic insurgents. The overwhelming majority of insurgent fighters in Southern Somalia are mostly young, unemployed, and illiterate who fight out of survival. Thus, the economic survival of violence that drives many of these young men to join in the ranks of Al-Shabab must be challenged and eventually replaced with other positive incentives of integrating them into society. In addition, transparent governance is essential in building local institutions robust enough to create incentives to earn the loyalty of young people while job creation and education of the young should be the heart of the matter in the long run. If this is achieved, local hard-lined militant groups will gradually crumble.

(2) Support local institutions by focusing on conflict-resolution initiatives. Working closely with progressive peace building organizations, particularly in the capital Mogadishu and throughout the South, is crucial. Despite the unquestioned skills and experience of your new administration, you suffer from a lack of tangible experience in the workings of a fragmented and stateless country, like Somalia. For confidence building measures, empower the existing progressive institutions to manage and resolve conflicts within or between communities. Since effective conflict-resolution is achieved when those who do not have political, social or economic stake in ongoing fighting come together and build a "constituency for peace." This can challenge the perpetrators of the bloodshed, and eventually promote the development of impetus toward peace. Also, work closely with local leaders to promote security in neighborhoods and on roads, thus encouraging local solutions to local problems by offering the people compelling justifications to support the TFG and its unwavering counterinsurgency efforts.

(2) Engage in recruiting Somalis in the Diaspora to volunteer working and investing inside Somalia. Since Somalis in the Diasporas have sustained the Somali economy for the past 20 years, it’s a high time that they step-up to the fore of resolving the ravaging conflict and rebuilding their native country. Attracting Somalis in the Diaspora back into their native country can be a powerful force on the side of the TFG, if used strategically. At first, recruit a small group of highly skilled Somali-Americans as a test case, with proper financing and backing from the U.S. government. They could serve as an important liaison between the Diaspora and other progressive elements inside the country who are seeking support in their efforts to fend-off the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalist groups, especially the Al-Shabab. In the wake of dozens of young Somali-Americans who vanished without any prior knowledge of their parents and joined in the ranks of Al-Shabab, there is an urgent need to support and organize a new prototype of “Somali Youth Peace Corps.” This will create an alternative means of support for those young Somalis in the Diaspora who are willing to help their country out of patriotism. Because it’s rather distressing to learn that these young men did not have any other alternative to help their native country from their adopted countries. Currently, there is no system of such support from any of the countries that the Somali Diaspora lives to transition them promote peace and development back in their native country, if they wish to do so.

Empowering these goodwill emissaries from the Somali Diaspora, to bring effective governance, basic services, and economic opportunity to their people in a manner integrated with nation building is the best way forward for a national reconciliation process. A great deal of any reconciliation effort must include comprehensive outreach program to help educate the community about terror-linked networks of the insurgents, supporting local schools and institutions, and advocating human rights, especially child protection from all sorts of exploitation, including religious extremism. Local institutions desperately need to draw on the expertise of civilian partners from the Somali Diaspora to develop resilient structures pertinent to everyday life. The government cannot do this alone. However, ensuring these efforts are properly aligned with the TFG will gradually weaken the Islamic militants and eventually mitigate the very real risk of a return to the chaos and warlordism that destroyed the country after the collapse of the Somali nation-state. Some of the challenges that such a program would face would be of course the security issue, which is in its worst phase for the past two decades. Nonetheless, to cower and do nothing is not an option.

(4) Collaborate with neutral African countries in the continent to train and recruit military and police forces for the TFG. Work closely with these countries in Somalia to eliminate insurgent save-havens is critical, but so is investment in local governance and development in the impoverished areas that have become breeding grounds for militants. Here too, potential recruits to the Islamic militant groups need a reason to support the government. This collaboration must be accompanied by an intensified effort to raise and recruit Somali forces. These forces should primarily concentrate on protecting the population. To that end, they must form allies among the people by minimizing the resentment and resistance associated with the presence of foreign troops in the country. The insurgencies cannot only be defeated militarily in order for Somalia to have peace, but there has to be an alternative for the young people whom they recruit. Improvement on these fronts, of course, would also support the fight against the radical Al-Shabab. Then, strike against the rebels whenever and wherever they reveal themselves.

Finally, it’s a critical time to reclaim Somalia’s stateliness by adapting these approaches to the realities of the conflict that the country now finds itself struggling would enable the TFG to defeat the unrelenting Islamic militants.

Godspeed in winning back Somalia.

Sincerely,

Heikal Kenneded

Washington D.C.

heikalk@yahoo.com

The Battle for Mogadishu

A Brief History of Misguided Domination

by Heikal Kenneded
Friday, April 01, 2011

A fierce battle is raging for control of Mogadishu while the blood of its residents is indiscriminately shed on its streets and neighborhoods. Reminiscent of its predecessors, the interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG) backed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is waging a desperate war against the hardcore Islamic militants, Al Shabab. The notion, however, war is the ultimate resolution to win the hearts and minds of the city’s residents is not only flawed but historically futile and dangerous. For in attempting to win back the country’s sovereignty in general and Mogadishu’s dignity through war, the TFG (now mostly run by the country’s last resort, the Somali Diaspora) will only hasten its expiration date and end up in the same history pages as previous regimes who appallingly failed to unite the country but rather pushed to its demise. This article examines the lessons learned from Mogadishu’s recent past failed conquest that might apply to current and future governments that wish to use only force in the control of Mogadishu and the country in general.

Throughout the world, Mogadishu became synonymous with war, chaos and unsurpassed intransigence to be ruled by one dominant force. There are two main reasons for these misguided perceptions. One is that those who tried to conquer it never paid much attention to the ancient city’s past history. Since the early days when world traveler Ibn Batuta visited in Mogadishu circa 1331, he described the city as "an exceedingly large city with merchants who exported to Egypt and elsewhere the excellent cloth made in the city.” Mogadishu has always been a center of commerce and civilization that defied the repeated aggression and colonization of foreign superpowers, including the Portuguese, the British and the Italians. Different cultures and sub-cultures peacefully coexisted throughout the city’s history, where they flooded into the city from the farthest edges of the county in order to shed-off their past misgivings and sought a final belonging.

Second, the sole use of overwhelming force has never been won the freedom and sovereignty of any country. Like all tragic cities, Mogadishu is cursed with ineffectual leaders who use force to subdue it instead of finding other means to cajole her into submission. In other words, those who quite often yearn to be its saviors eventually see to its demise. Take for example, Siyad Barre’s fervent revolution to rid the country from corruption, tribalism and retrograde mentality (dib-u- socodnimo), until he became so entrenched in his absolute power and consolidated his forces to decimate the country from all intellectuals and potential leaders that he saw Somalia to its current dismal state. He was immediately followed by another ruthless warmonger, M. F. Aideed whose manic fervor for war and bloodshed bordered beyond madness that he finally plunged the entire country into a protracted civil war, which forever changed Mogadishu’s historical coexistence temperament. In fact, when the rest of the world tried to rescue the city from its fateful precipice by using military power, the U.S. Marines under the umbrella of the United Nations suffered a humiliating strategic trounce after they miserably failed to stop the chaos in the city or subdue the ragtag militia of General Aideed, but they immediately withdrew from Somalia in defeat. In 1996, General Aideed himself was finally gunned down in the same battlefields where he killed many others.

In result, Mogadishu’s misfortunes took a worse turn when marauding warlords who emerged from the brunt of the civil war divided the city into several medieval fiefdoms, rife with checkpoints to abuse and pillage the city’s vulnerable residents. During these dark days when the warlords (with comical names like: Qanyare, Yalaxow, Caato, Finnish, and Qeybdiid) became the de facto rulers of the city, they financed themselves by engaging in various crimes ranging from drug dealing, looting, kidnapping, and entering contracts with foreign countries to dump their nuclear waste in the Somali coasts. Ironically, most of these incorrigible warlords currently occupy in the seats of the so called Somali Transitional Parliament as “honorable” MPs, where they recently extended their soon to expire mandate for another three-years so that they can maintain their grip to sabotage the potential birth of any legitimate government in the country.

Arta, Djibouti, in 2000, ten years later when the Somali nation state collapsed, the first transitional government headed by Abdiqasim Salad was established in Djibouti. Mr. Salad’s pious demeanor belied of his mischievous past, as one of the most corrupted underlings of the Siyad Barre regime. Instead of working towards peace and reconciliation in accordance with the platform instituted in the Djibouti peace conference, he had other secret, grand ambitions to advance his sub-clan by resettling them in the country’s most fertile land of the Juba River, where they claim to be the predominant clan of the inter-reverine (Juba and Shabelle) communities and enslave the actual natives of the land, up to this today. The short lived regime of Abdiqasim Salad lorded over a landscape of repression, corruption and unprecedented land grab by force.

As though the country had not seen enough suffering through the hands of governments invented outside of the country, another foreign concocted Somali peace conference in Kenya resulted in the coronation of yet another callous military man, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf and his kleptomaniac prime minister, Ali M. Ghedi. These implausible pair committed one of the most sacrilegious national crimes in the country’s history by allowing Somalia’s sworn archenemy Ethiopia to freely march in the streets Mogadishu in order to defeat the Islamic Courts who capriciously imposedSharia law in the country. An unprecedented humanitarian disaster of epic proportions followed as soon as Ali M. Gedi rode into Mogadishu on the back of Ethiopian tanks. Indeed, future historians will note down that the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia was the last straw that saw to its total collapse, beyond repair.

Furthermore, Mogadishu suffered yet another humiliating defeat led by one of its purported saviors who emerged from the struggle to rid the country from the occupying Ethiopian forces – Al Shabab. These latest Islamic militants are allegedly financed and used by illusive foreign elements that have other global jihadist interests beyond Somali borders and wish to render the country into a breeding ground for terrorists. In their distorted efforts to reclaim the country, this radical Islamic group kills, tortures, destroys and desecrates the graves of the country’s most revered religious leaders. But if the history of Somalia is any guide to us, their end is near and they will eventually test the wrath of their own making.

The important lesson that can be drawn from these brief historical anecdotes is that Mogadishu is a city that can only be understood through its historical context, location and civilization but it cannot be conquered under the muzzle of the gun, especially by foreign forces who pound with rockets on its residents. Regardless of how significantly the TFG and its AMISOM packers advance against the Al-Shabaab militia in the battlefields of Mogadishu, they are bound to reconcile with the fact that in the end they will be seen as oppressors but not liberators, like their predecessors in the past and that’s a dangerous territory to be boxed in.

An Open Letter to Prime Minister M. A. Farmaajo, I implored him not to rush into war and instead urged him to adopt policies that strengthen governance and conflict resolution strategies. These would have been tangible tactics for advancing peaceful negotiations and bringing the country closer to any semblance of order. Unfortunately, the TFG led by Sheikh Sharif and PM Farmaajo is mainly focused on the imminent expiration of their government’s mandate and seem to be doing anything to leave their mark by defeating the Al-Shabab militia. Nevertheless, to succeed on the asymmetric battlefields of Mogadishu’s streets requires not only unsurpassed political prowess but also a wide range of negotiation skills to draw closer all stakeholders that have a genuine interest of the city’s welfare. But amassing foreign troops into the city who only care for their financial gain rather than liberating the country from tyranny is simply a non-starter.

Heikal Kenneded
heikalk@yahoo.com
Washington D.C.